The functional neuroanatomy of actions.

Abstract

Our current understanding of the neural basis of semantic memory is informed primarily by studies of concrete objects. However, conceptual knowledge encompasses many other, albeit less concrete, domains. This article reviews evidence from neuroimaging and patient studies that speaks to the neural basis of action concepts and the words that refer to them. These data highlight 2 important principles governing the neural instantiation of semantic knowledge. First, the organization of conceptual representations in the brain parallels perception and action. Action concepts are at least partially represented within modality-specific areas responsible for the perception and execution of dynamic actions. Second, unimodal sensory and motor cortices act as "points of entry" for more abstract action knowledge. Increasingly abstract conceptual knowledge derived from these modalities is represented in brain areas located anterior and centripetal to modality-specific regions. Extending research on the neural basis of semantics to include dynamic and relational aspects of the world gives us a more complete appreciation of the range of cognitive and communication impairments that may be experienced by patients with neurologic disease.