More fair play in an ultimatum game after resettlement in Zimbabwe: a field experiment and a structural model.

Abstract

Zimbabwean villagers of distinct background have resettled in government-organized land reforms for more than three decades. Against this backdrop, I assess the level of social cohesion in some of the newly established communities by estimating the average preferences for fairness in a structural model of bounded rationality. The estimations are based on behavioral data from an ultimatum game field experiment played by 234 randomly selected households in 6 traditional and 14 resettled villages almost two decades after resettlement. Equal or higher degrees of fairness are estimated in all resettlement schemes. In one, or arguably two, out of three distinct resettlement schemes studied, the resettled villagers exhibit significantly higher degrees of fairness (p ≤ 0.11) and rationality (p ≤ 0.04) than those who live in traditional villages. Overall, villagers appear similarly rational, but the attitude toward fairness is significantly stronger in resettled communities (p ≤ 0.01). These findings are consistent with the idea of an increased need for cooperation required in recommencement.