Analogy, cognitive architecture and universal construction: a tale of two systematicities.

Abstract

Cognitive science recognizes two kinds of systematicity: (1) as the property where certain cognitive capacities imply certain other related cognitive capacities (Fodor and Pylyshyn); and (2) as the principle that analogical mappings based on collections of connected relations are preferred over relations in isolation (Gentner). Whether these kinds of systematicity are two aspects of a deeper property of cognition is hitherto unknown. Here, it is shown that both derive from the formal, category-theoretic notion of universal construction. In conceptual/psychological terms, a universal construction is a form of optimization of cognitive resources: optimizing the re-utilization of common component processes for common task components. Systematic cognitive capacity and the capacity for analogy are hallmarks of human cognition, which suggests that universal constructions (in the category-theoretic sense) are a crucial component of human cognitive architecture.