Influences of agents with a self-reputation awareness component in an evolutionary spatial IPD game.
basic_science · Level V
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- Record sourced from PubMed, PMID 24945966.
- Also identified by DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0099841 and PMC identifier 4063756.
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Abstract
Iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) researchers have shown that strong positive reputations plus an efficient reputation evaluation system encourages both sides to pursue long-term collaboration and to avoid falling into mutual defection cycles. In agent-based environments with reliable reputation rating systems, agents interested in maximizing their private interests must show concern for other agents as well as their own self-reputations--an important capability that standard IPD game agents lack. Here we present a novel learning agent model possessing self-reputation awareness. Agents in our proposed model are capable of evaluating self-behaviors based on a mix of public and private interest considerations, and of testing various solutions aimed at meeting social standards. Simulation results indicate multiple outcomes from the addition of a small percentage of self-reputation awareness agents: faster cooperation, faster movement toward stability in an agent society, a higher level of public interest in the agent society, the resolution of common conflicts between public and private interests, and a lower potential for rational individual behavior to transform into irrational group behavior.
Medical subject headings
- Cooperative Behavior
- Game Theory
- Social Facilitation