Extension of a spatial evolutionary coordination game with neutral options.
basic_science · Level V
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- Record sourced from PubMed, PMID 27300831.
- Also identified by DOI 10.1103/PhysRevE.93.052108.
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Abstract
The multiagent evolutionary games on a lattice are equivalent to a kinetic Ising model if the uniform pair interactions are defined by a two-strategy coordination game and the logit rule controls the strategy updates. Now we extend this model by allowing the players to use additional neutral strategies that provide zero payoffs for both players if one of them selects one of the neutral strategies. In the resulting n-strategy evolutionary games the analytical methods and numerical simulations indicate continuous order-disorder phase transitions when increasing the noise level if n does not exceed a threshold value. For larger n the system exhibits a first order phase transition at a critical noise level decreasing asymptotically as 2/ln(n).