Impact of interaction style and degree on the evolution of cooperation on Barabási-Albert scale-free network.

Abstract

In this work, we study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on Barabási-Albert scale-free networks with limited player interactions, and explore the effect of interaction style and degree on cooperation. The results show that high-degree preference interaction, namely the most applicable interaction in the real world, is less beneficial for emergence of cooperation on scale-free networks than random interaction. Besides, cooperation on scale-free networks is enhanced with the increase of interaction degree regardless whether the interaction is high-degree preference or random. If the interaction degree is very low, the cooperation level on scale-free networks is much lower than that on regular ring networks, which is against the common belief that scale-free networks must be more beneficial for cooperation. Our analysis indicates that the interaction relations, the strategy and the game payoff of high-connectivity players play important roles in the evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks. A certain number of interactions are necessary for scale-free networks to exhibit strong capability of facilitating cooperation. Our work provides important insight for members on how to interact with others in a social organization.