On the optimal management of environmental stock externalities.
other · Level V
Where this comes from
- Record sourced from PubMed, PMID 35687672.
- Also identified by DOI 10.1073/pnas.2202679119 and PMC identifier 9214520.
- Licence recorded as CC BY-NC-ND.
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Abstract
Following a brief review of the management of environmental externalities under strategic interactions in the traditional temporal domain, results are extended to the spatiotemporal domain. Conditions for spatial open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, along with conditions for the benchmark cooperative solution, are presented and compared. A simplified numerical example illustrates the spatial patterns emerging at a steady state under Fickian diffusion and dispersal kernels, and the inefficiency of spatially flat emission taxes. This conceptual framework could provide new research areas.