Economic interests cloud hazard reductions in the European regulation of substances of very high concern.

Abstract

Here we investigate how the conflicts between hazard reduction and economic interests have shaped the regulation of substances of very high concern (SVHCs) under the Authorization program of the European chemical regulation Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). Since regulation starts with listing SVHCs on the Candidate List, we analyze the relative importance of toxicological properties, economic motivations, and available scientific knowledge on the probability of inclusion on the Candidate List. We find that the most important factor in whether a substance is listed is whether it is being produced in, or imported into, the European Economic Area (EEA), with the regulators less likely to place a substance on the list if it is currently being produced or imported in the EEA. This evidence suggests that regulators have listed chemicals of secondary importance leading to lesser than anticipated hazard reductions, either because production and imports had already ceased before the listing, or because the compound has never been produced or imported in the EEA at all.