The incentive role of media companies' executive compensation system in transformation and upgrading: Evidence from listed media companies in China.

Abstract

Media companies in various countries are transforming and upgrading to improve their competitiveness in the digital economy. However, existing research only focuses on the issue of how media companies transform while ignoring whether internal governance mechanisms such as compensation incentives can promote corporate value during the transformation process. According to the principal-agent theory, we examined the incentive effects of the executive compensation system in terms of monetary compensation, equity compensation, and perks in a sample of Chinese media companies in the process of transformation and upgrading. The results have revealed that monetary compensation does not have a significant incentive effect, and equity compensation and perks have an incentive effect when they are in the suitable range. Based on the results, we proposed policy recommendations from three aspects: monetary compensation, equity compensation, and perks. This study complements the research content on the executive compensation system in media enterprises' transformation and upgrading. It can provide a reference for setting the administrative compensation system for media companies in China and other emerging economies.