Independent director compensation and stock price collapse: Inhibition or promotion-based on a financial background perspective.
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- Record sourced from PubMed, PMID 37561795.
- Also identified by DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0289986 and PMC identifier 10414673.
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Abstract
This paper takes the financial independent directors' compensation of listed companies from 2014 to 2020 as the research object and uses empirical analysis to study whether the compensation of financial independent directors promotes or inhibits stock price collapse. The research results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the compensation of financial independent directors of listed companies and stock price collapse. In state-owned enterprises, the compensation of financial independent directors has an inhibitory effect on stock price collapse, but it is not significant. In non-state-owned enterprises, the compensation of financial independent directors has a significant promoting effect on stock price collapse. Further research finds that the improvement of internal control quality can weaken the promoting effect of financial independent directors' compensation on stock price collapse to a certain extent, and the weakening effect is particularly evident in non-state-owned enterprises. The attendance frequency of financial independent directors cannot effectively suppress stock price collapse, but instead has a promoting effect.