Exploring the interplay of new energy vehicle enterprises, consumers, and government in the context of the "dual carbon" target: An evolutionary game and simulation analysis.

Abstract

To achieve low-carbon and green mobility, the government needs to encourage people to buy and use new energy vehicles. This study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model among new energy vehicle manufacturers, consumers, and government agencies. The game strategy combinations of each party and the stability conditions of the equilibrium point in the evolutionary game system are analyzed, and the validity of the conclusions is verified by simulation results. Compared with traditional studies that suggest the government should adopt the direct subsidy policy, this study shows that in the early stage of new energy vehicle development, government subsidies are still important for the rapid growth of new energy vehicle production and sales, but indirect policies can play a key role as the new energy vehicle industry matures. In addition to the price, the attractiveness of vehicle brands, the perceived utility of the products among consumers, and the coverage of charging infrastructure in cities also determine whether consumers decide to purchase and use new energy vehicles. The findings could provide useful recommendations for governments and manufacturers of new energy vehicles to meet their "dual carbon" targets.