Investment analysis of the private firm under different financial arrangements in infrastructure projects.

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of various financial arrangements on the investment behavior of the private firm in PPP (Public-Private Partnership) projects. The results manifest that: first, the private firm will invest in the project earlier under long-term debt financing than under short-term debt financing or all equity financing; second, the investment boundary of the private sector decreasing with the probability of obtaining long-term debt financing under short-term debt financing, while increasing with the probability of obtaining long-term debt financing under long-term debt financing; third, the optimal debt level under short-term debt financing displays a U-shaped relationship with the refinancing risk probability; fourth, under short-term debt financing, the difference in the optimal capital structure between projects with different volatility of cash flow is larger when the refinancing risk probability is lower; and fifth, the private firm may exit the project earlier under short-term debt financing than under long-term debt financing. These results can help us to understand the investment behavior of the private firm under different financial arrangements.