Moderate confirmation bias enhances decision-making in groups of reinforcement-learning agents.

Abstract

Humans tend to give more weight to information confirming their beliefs than to information that disconfirms them. Nevertheless, this apparent irrationality has been shown to improve individual decision-making under uncertainty. However, little is known about this bias' impact on decision-making in a social context. Here, we investigate the conditions under which confirmation bias is beneficial or detrimental to decision-making under social influence. To do so, we develop a Collective Asymmetric Reinforcement Learning (CARL) model in which artificial agents observe others' actions and rewards, and update this information asymmetrically. We use agent-based simulations to study how confirmation bias affects collective performance on a two-armed bandit task, and how resource scarcity, group size and bias strength modulate this effect. We find that a confirmation bias benefits group learning across a wide range of resource-scarcity conditions. Moreover, we discover that, past a critical bias strength, resource abundance favors the emergence of two different performance regimes, one of which is suboptimal. In addition, we find that this regime bifurcation comes with polarization in small groups of agents. Overall, our results suggest the existence of an optimal, moderate level of confirmation bias for decision-making in a social context.