Coordination of network heterogeneity and individual preferences promotes collective fairness.

Abstract

There are intensive debates about whether heterogeneous networks promote prosocial behaviors such as fairness and cooperation. Theoretical models predict that network heterogeneity plays a positive role, but this prediction has not been validated by experiments. We reconcile this debate by conducting experiments with two-stage ultimatum games on networks. In the first stage, we identify responders with strong fairness preferences, referred to as leaders. In the second stage, when leaders occupy high-degree nodes in a heterogeneous network, their ability to motivate fairness among neighboring proposers is amplified, and collective fairness is facilitated. We propose an evolutionary game model and an agent-based simulation framework that capture the microscopic mechanisms underlying the networked experiments. Our experiments, model, and simulations suggest that network reciprocity is achievable but requires coordinated interactions between different prosocial inclinations of individuals and social network structures.